The scene on the ramp at Heathrow's Terminal Four, with two needle-nosed, ogival wing-shaped Concordes in British Airways' livery and nary another aircraft type visible, had been like discovering an advanced time pocket in which a science fiction setting of exclusively supersonic aircraft had formed an integral part of this future society's air transportation system. But what had made this vista particularly awe striking had been the fact that, in 1994, that this scene had been played out for almost two decades. Aircraft G-BOAC, operating as Flight BA 189 to Washington-Dulles, and aircraft G-BOAG, operating as Flight BA 003 to New York-JFK, had been in the process of being serviced for their daily, evening transatlantic supersonic crossings, while a third had conducted its nose-high flare in the distance. I would bullet across the pond on the second of the two.
Pushed back from the gate at 1900 local time by the tug connected to its elongated wheel strut well below its needle nose, the aircraft had extended its visor and nose cone to the five-degree position before maneuvering away from Terminal Four under its own power with a brief throttle advancement.
Inter-tank fuel transfer, ensuring an aft, 53.5-percent center of gravity and increased take off wing lift, had been coupled with a 1.5-unit, pre-set stabilizer trim. The ogival wing's design itself, incorporating camber, twist, taper, and droop, along with its significant area, had precluded the necessity for leading or trailing edge high-lift devices, thus decreasing structural weight and drag, and its long chord, obviating the need for separate elevators, had permitted the effective replacement of six trailing edge elevons which had been operated by an equal number of power flying control units fed by 4,000-psi hydraulic fluid systems pressurized by engine-driven pumps and activated by electrical, or fly-by-wire, signaling. Two identically powered vertical tail surfaces had completed Concorde's hinged devices, for a total of eight.
Turning on to the threshold of Runway 9-Right and throttling into its acceleration roll, Concorde G-BOAG, unleashing a deafening roar with its four Rolls Royce/SNECMA Olympus 593 turbojets, ate the runway with deep, throaty determination, inducing its rotational pitch by its six, upward-angling elevons at a 194-knot V1 speed and disengaging itself from the ground at a 217-knot V2 to cater to its 177,800-kg gross weight, trailing a thick smoke plume. Fuel added to its afterburner gases dilated its exhaust nozzles with fire-like fury, increasing its thrust capability by 17-percent and producing a 1.7-greater thrust-to-weight ratio than the Air Namibia 747 which had preceded it into the sky.
Ceasing afterburner light one minute, 15 seconds into the flight due to overland supersonic speed restrictions, the now power-depleted aircraft dipped its nose downward to assume a shallower ascent profile.
Having completed its initial departure course left bank and two right ones, it had proceeded on a westerly heading over Reading toward the west coast of Great Britain, climbing through 5,500 feet at a Mach 0.57 airspeed over the ground's green patchwork quilt whose geometric pattern receded in size beneath the 70-degree swept ogival wings.
A slightly pink-hued mist off the port side, where the sun had begun to inch toward the western horizon, had brush-stroked the sky's canvas, but Flight 003 would outpace the day's denouement to its destination, never eclipsing the line between light and darkness.
Climbing through 9,000 feet at 500 knots, or Mach 0.71, the aircraft, with its nose and visor having been intermittently raised, shifted its center of gravity to 55 percent. Its 13-tank fuel system, located in its delta wings and arranged in three groups according to "engine feed," "main transfer," and "trim transfer," had been the design's only method of center of gravity shift, although the tanks' equal distribution throughout the wings' planform had ensured that it would remain constant during in-flight fuel burn unless transfer had necessitated pitch changes, such as those during descent.
Passing out over the glass-appearing surface of the Bristol Channel, south of Cardiff, Wales, at 51 degrees north latitude, the aircraft had completed its transonic checklist and the throaty grind of its engines had indicated full throttle applications and afterburner re-alighting. As if unleashed from hitherto invisible moorings, the needle-nosed aircraft, emitting fire-trailing, fuel-burning, thrust-producing projections from its two Olympus turbojet pairings with a barely detectable forward lurch, had transcended the speed and pressure of sound and settled into the Mach 1.00 eclipsing, altitude-gaining, nose high-projecting flight profile for which the engineers had intended it during its 15-year development period. Closely carrying its engines next to its narrow, arrow-like fuselage beneath its ogival wing, and generating no horizontal tail air resistance, the aircraft had entered the rock-steady, motionless void between the pale blue of the channel below and the indigo blue of sky above south of Ireland, accelerating through Mach 1.24, an envelope no present subsonic airliner had ever experienced. For Concorde, it had been "home."
Three thousand four hundred thirty miles had separated Flight 003 from its destination, a distance to be devoured at a little less than double its current 860 knots. Passing over a contrail emitted by a subsonic airliner which had undoubtedly been at the peak of its service ceiling, it had reached an altitude just over half of its own.
Shrouded in roaring slipstream and ascending through 43,000 feet at a 1,090-knot, or March 1.70, airspeed, the aircraft had discontinued afterburner use, its climb angle no longer supportable by their excess power.
As Concorde's needle nose had pierced the tropopause at supersonic speeds, a delicate balancing act had begun: with the engine's insatiable, 50,000-pounds-of-fuel-per-hour thirst at full throttle settings, the aircraft would quickly exceed its maximum design speed due to in-flight burn-off and a resultant decrease in gross weight. Instead, the airspeed increase would be counteracted by a gradual ascent through its assigned block altitude, its auto flight system ensuring a Mach 2.00 velocity.
Delicate cirrus wisps moved well below the delta wings at a velocity I had never previously experienced.
A five-course dinner, paralleling British Airways' subsonic Club World business class service, had commenced in the narrow, single-aisle cabin.
Cocooned in the slender, tapering fuselage on the lower fringes of space where the earth's curvature had just become visible and trailing an invisible, cone-shaped wave whose thunderclap-like explosion could only be heard by an Atlantic surface-plying vessel, delta-winged Concorde G-BOAG had cruised ten miles above the planet, devouring 23 miles with every sweep of the clock's second hand, friction-induced heat producing 127-degree Celsius temperatures on its nose, 92 degrees at it wing root, and 98 degrees at its tip. Wing tank-located fuel rose to the 200-degree boiling point. The tiny, 46 passenger windows lining either side of the fuselage, had been hot to the touch, yet, because of the aircraft's 10.7 pounds-per-square-inch pressure differential, its cabin elevation had been the equivalent of 5,600 feet, 2,400 feet lower than that traditionally created by a subsonic airliner cruising at 37,000 feet. The radiation meter in the cockpit, running from 0.1 to 1,000 millirons, with "10" the "alert" reading and "50" the "action" position, had hovered between 0.7 and 0.9, a level higher than that of a subsonic, but Concorde's speed had exposed its passengers and crew to this level for a shorter period of time.
Pursuing the Atlantic by latitude and longitude coordinate waypoints, each separated by minutes and progressive fuel burn off-induced weight reductions, the aircraft had paradoxically seemed suspended, without motion, over the ocean-blanketed white fleece-like cumulonimbus whose pattern had resembled an intricately connected mosaic of pack ice south of Greenland, one of the crossing's untouched land masses. In fact, it would not encounter land until it had reached a point just miles from its assigned runway.
Having pinnacled at 57,000 feet, and having subjected its aluminum-alloy fuselage to an eight-inch, heat-generated, enroute expansion, the supersonic transport, maintaining altitude, retarded its four engine throttles to an initial 18-degree and subsequent 34-degree position at Mach 1.60. Attaining a 1,000-knot indicated air speed, it had been subjected to its second cooling-heating cycle as it had begun to penetrate lower-altitude, higher-temperature air. Retransferring fuel to the forward wing tanks and activating its anti-atmospheric devices, such as its pitot tube heat, it had maintained a 5,000 foot-per-minute descent rate until it had intercepted 39,000 feet, the upper realm of subsonic travel.
Recrossing land for the first time since Great Britain, Concorde had passed over the western tip of Rockaway Beach, unleashing its long-strutted undercarriage into the slipstream and extending its nose to its full, 12-5-degree position.
Crossing Rockaway Inlet and southern Brooklyn, Flight 003 had been handed off from terminal radar approach control to the JFK Tower, executing the Belt Parkway-paralleling Canarsie Approach to Runway 13-Right. Its flapless, ogival-shaped wings, which had required long main gear struts to cater to its high flare angle clearance requirements, had necessitated final-stage, height-to-ground radio altimeter readings: 500 feet...400...300...
Making a final right bank to 130 degrees, Concorde, with its drooped nose and hawk-like, outstretched main wheel struts, had passed over the airport-perimeter roadway and runway-protective blast fence at a 155-knot Vref speed to overcome its 105,433-kg landing weight. Flaring on to the strip with an additional one-degree backward yoke movement, it had entered ground effect, cushioned between the surface and its underside at 100 feet, which had required a further elevon application in order to maintain its pitch angle. The radio altimeter had continued to unwind: 50 feet...40...30...20...
Closing its throttles at 15 feet, it bit into the concrete with main wheel tire erupting smoke puffs before applying sufficient forward yoke pressure to rotate the nose wheel to the surface, yet maintain a small enough cushion effect to do so.
Decelerating to 100 knots, it had throttled its two outboard engines into their idle reverse thrust settings, mimicking the action with its two inboard engines at 75 knots, their secondary nozzle buckets closing, like clamshell doors, over the exhaust and deflecting it up- and downward.
Making the 180-degree turn on to taxiway echo to the inner perimeter, aircraft G-BOAG, whose glowing, energy-absorbing brakes had intermittently heated up to 300 degrees Celsius, had raised its nose to the five-degree position a final time and taxied to Gate 5 of the British Airways Terminal, now inundated on the ramp by a fleet of widebody, subsonic 747, DC-10, and 767 intercontinental equipment, appearing strangely out-of-place, like a design of the future which had somehow returned to the past.
Defeated in numbers, but triumphant in speed, Concorde, shutting down its engines at 1750 local time and causing its trailing edge, hydraulic power-severed elevons to gravity-snag downward, had completed the 3,458-mile transatlantic crossing in three hours, 19 minutes, or half the time of an intercontinental subsonic.
Having made the subsonic crossing myself on countless previous occasions, I exited the slender forward, left aircraft door and tunneled through the jetbridge to the terminal, somewhat disoriented. I had clearly been in New York, but what had happened to the other half of the journey, I had wondered? Somewhere over the Atlantic, in a three-sided equation of time, speed, and distance, lay the answer...
A graduate of Long Island University-C.W. Post Campus with a summa-cum-laude BA Degree in Comparative Languages and Journalism, I have subsequently earned the Continuing Community Education Teaching Certificate from the Nassau Association for Continuing Community Education (NACCE) at Molloy College, the Travel Career Development Certificate from the Institute of Certified Travel Agents (ICTA) at LIU, and the AAS Degree in Aerospace Technology at the State University of New York - College of Technology at Farmingdale. Having amassed almost three decades in the airline industry, I managed the New York-JFK and Washington-Dulles stations at Austrian Airlines, created the North American Station Training Program, served as an Aviation Advisor to Farmingdale State University of New York, and devised and taught the Airline Management Certificate Program at the Long Island Educational Opportunity Center. A freelance author, I have written some 70 books of the short story, novel, nonfiction, essay, poetry, article, log, curriculum, training manual, and textbook genre in English, German, and Spanish, having principally focused on aviation and travel, and I have been published in book, magazine, newsletter, and electronic Web site form. I am a writer for Cole Palen's Old Rhinebeck Aerodrome in New York. I have made some 350 lifetime trips by air, sea, rail, and road.
Article Source: http://EzineArticles.com/?expert=Robert_Waldvogel
Showing posts with label concorde history. Show all posts
Showing posts with label concorde history. Show all posts
Tuesday, 7 September 2010
Tuesday, 27 July 2010
Public Perception Of Concorde
Concorde was normally perceived as a privilege of the rich, but special circular or one-way (with return by coach or ship) charter flights were arranged to bring a trip within the means of moderately well-off enthusiasts. It is a symbol of great national pride to many in the UK and France; in France it was thought of as a French aircraft, in the UK as British.
The aircraft was usually referred to by the British as simply "Concorde", whilst in France it was known as "le Concorde" due to "le", the definite article, being used in French grammar to distinguish a proper name from a common noun of the same spelling. In French, the common noun concorde means "agreement, harmony, or peace", and the aircraft’s name was almost certainly chosen for its allusion to the collaboration between the British and French governments. Concorde’s pilots and British Airways in official publications and videos often refer to Concorde
both in the singular and plural as "she" or "her".
As a symbol of national pride, an example from the BA fleet made occasional flypasts at selected Royal events, major air shows and other special occasions, sometimes in formation with the Red Arrows. On the final day of commercial service, public interest was so great that grandstands were erected at London’s Heathrow Airport to afford a view of the final arrivals. Crowds filled the boundary road around the airport and there was extensive media coverage.
Thirty-seven years after her first test flight, Concorde was announced the winner of the Great British Design Quest organised by the BBC and the Design Museum. A total of 212,000 votes were cast with Concorde
beating design icons such as the Mini, mini skirt, Jaguar E-type, Tube map and the Supermarine Spitfire.
The aircraft was usually referred to by the British as simply "Concorde", whilst in France it was known as "le Concorde" due to "le", the definite article, being used in French grammar to distinguish a proper name from a common noun of the same spelling. In French, the common noun concorde means "agreement, harmony, or peace", and the aircraft’s name was almost certainly chosen for its allusion to the collaboration between the British and French governments. Concorde’s pilots and British Airways in official publications and videos often refer to Concorde
As a symbol of national pride, an example from the BA fleet made occasional flypasts at selected Royal events, major air shows and other special occasions, sometimes in formation with the Red Arrows. On the final day of commercial service, public interest was so great that grandstands were erected at London’s Heathrow Airport to afford a view of the final arrivals. Crowds filled the boundary road around the airport and there was extensive media coverage.
Thirty-seven years after her first test flight, Concorde was announced the winner of the Great British Design Quest organised by the BBC and the Design Museum. A total of 212,000 votes were cast with Concorde
Tuesday, 13 July 2010
Flight 4590 - The Paris Crash
Accident Investigation
The official investigation was conducted by France’s accident investigation bureau, the BEA, and it was published on 14 December 2004. It concluded that the crash was caused by a titanium strip, part of a thrust reverser, that fell from a Continental Airlines DC-10 (Continental Flight 55) to Houston that had taken off about four minutes earlier. This metal fragment punctured the Concorde's tyres, which then disintegrated. A piece of rubber hit the fuel tank and broke an electrical cable. The impact caused a shock-wave that fractured the fuel tank some distance from the point of impact. This caused a major fuel leak from the tank, which then ignited. The crew shut down engine number two in response to a fire warning but were unable to retract the landing gear, which hampered the aircraft's ability to climb. With engine number one surging and producing little power, the aircraft was unable to gain height or speed, entering a rapid pitch-up then a violent descent, rolling left. The impact occurred with the stricken aircraft tail-low, crashing into the Hotelissimo Hotel in Gonesse. According to the report, the piece of titanium from the DC-10 had not been approved by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration.
Conclusions
The investigators concluded that:
British investigators and former French Concorde pilots looked at several other possibilities that the report ignored, including an unbalanced weight distribution in the fuel tanks and loose landing gear. They came to the conclusion that the Concorde veered off course on the runway, which reduced take-off speed below the crucial minimum. The aircraft had passed close to a Boeing 747 carrying French President Jacques Chirac who was returning from the 26th G8 summit meeting in Okinawa, Japan, which was much further down the runway than the Concorde's usual take-off point; only then did it strike the metal strip from the DC-10.
The Concorde was overweight for the given conditions, with an excessively aft centre of gravity and taking off downwind. When it stood at the end of the runway, ready to roll, it was over its approved maximum take-off weight for the given conditions.
The Concorde was missing the crucial spacer from the left main landing-gear beam that would have made for a snug-fitting pivot. This compromised the alignment of the landing gear and the wobbling beam and gears allowing three degrees of movement possible in any direction. The uneven load on the left leg’s three remaining tyres skewed the landing gear, with the scuff marks of four tyres on the runway showing that the plane was veering to the left.
Finally, Brian Trubshaw and John Cochrane, the Concorde's two test pilots when the aircraft was being developed in the early 1970s, set the aft operating limit at 54 percent - beyond that, they found, it risked becoming uncontrollable, likely to rear up backwards and crash, exactly as Flight 4590 did in its final moments over Gonesse. However, Flight 4590's centre of gravity went beyond 54 percent, with the BEA stating a figure of 54.2 percent, while a senior industry source said that the true figure may have been worse: with the extra fuel and bags, it may have been up to 54.6 percent.
The official investigation was conducted by France’s accident investigation bureau, the BEA, and it was published on 14 December 2004. It concluded that the crash was caused by a titanium strip, part of a thrust reverser, that fell from a Continental Airlines DC-10 (Continental Flight 55) to Houston that had taken off about four minutes earlier. This metal fragment punctured the Concorde's tyres, which then disintegrated. A piece of rubber hit the fuel tank and broke an electrical cable. The impact caused a shock-wave that fractured the fuel tank some distance from the point of impact. This caused a major fuel leak from the tank, which then ignited. The crew shut down engine number two in response to a fire warning but were unable to retract the landing gear, which hampered the aircraft's ability to climb. With engine number one surging and producing little power, the aircraft was unable to gain height or speed, entering a rapid pitch-up then a violent descent, rolling left. The impact occurred with the stricken aircraft tail-low, crashing into the Hotelissimo Hotel in Gonesse. According to the report, the piece of titanium from the DC-10 had not been approved by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration.
Conclusions
The investigators concluded that:
- After reaching take-off speed, the tyre of the number 2 wheel was cut by a metal strip lying on the runway, which came from the thrust reverser cowl door of the number 3 engine of a Continental Airlines DC-10 that had taken off from the runway several minutes before. This strip was installed in violation of the manufacturer's rules.
- The aircraft was slightly overloaded by about a ton.
- The aircraft was airworthy and the crew was qualified. The landing gear that later failed to retract had not shown serious problems in the past. Despite the crew being trained and certified, no plan existed for the simultaneous failure of two engines on the runway, as it was considered highly unlikely.
- Aborting the take-off would have led to a high-speed runway excursion and collapse of the landing gear, which also would have caused the aircraft to crash.
- While two of the engines had problems and one of them was shut down, the damage to the plane's structure was so severe that the crash would have been inevitable, even with the engines operating normally.
British investigators and former French Concorde pilots looked at several other possibilities that the report ignored, including an unbalanced weight distribution in the fuel tanks and loose landing gear. They came to the conclusion that the Concorde veered off course on the runway, which reduced take-off speed below the crucial minimum. The aircraft had passed close to a Boeing 747 carrying French President Jacques Chirac who was returning from the 26th G8 summit meeting in Okinawa, Japan, which was much further down the runway than the Concorde's usual take-off point; only then did it strike the metal strip from the DC-10.
The Concorde was overweight for the given conditions, with an excessively aft centre of gravity and taking off downwind. When it stood at the end of the runway, ready to roll, it was over its approved maximum take-off weight for the given conditions.
The Concorde was missing the crucial spacer from the left main landing-gear beam that would have made for a snug-fitting pivot. This compromised the alignment of the landing gear and the wobbling beam and gears allowing three degrees of movement possible in any direction. The uneven load on the left leg’s three remaining tyres skewed the landing gear, with the scuff marks of four tyres on the runway showing that the plane was veering to the left.
Finally, Brian Trubshaw and John Cochrane, the Concorde's two test pilots when the aircraft was being developed in the early 1970s, set the aft operating limit at 54 percent - beyond that, they found, it risked becoming uncontrollable, likely to rear up backwards and crash, exactly as Flight 4590 did in its final moments over Gonesse. However, Flight 4590's centre of gravity went beyond 54 percent, with the BEA stating a figure of 54.2 percent, while a senior industry source said that the true figure may have been worse: with the extra fuel and bags, it may have been up to 54.6 percent.
Monday, 5 July 2010
Fears Concorde Attraction In Bristol Will Close
The Concorde visitor attraction in Bristol is to be closed in October for maintenance leading to fears that it could be shut down permanently.
Full article: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/bristol/10460246.stm
Full article: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/bristol/10460246.stm
Labels:
bristol,
concorde,
concorde history,
filton,
supersonic airliner
Wednesday, 30 June 2010
Concorde: Power And Speed
Concorde's four engines - specially designed Rolls-Royce/ Snecma Olympus 593s - give more than 38,000lbs of thrust each, with 'reheat'. This adds fuel to the final stage of the engine to produce the extra power required for take-off and the transition to supersonic flight. They are the most powerful pure jet engines flying commercially.
Concorde takes off at 220 knots (250mph) (compared with 165 knots for most subsonic aircraft). She cruises at around 1350mph - more than twice the speed of sound - and at an altitude of up to 60,000 ft (over 11 miles high). A typical London to New York crossing would take a little less than three and a half hours as opposed to about eight hours for a subsonic flight. Travelling Westwards, the five-hour time difference meant Concorde effectively arrived before she left. She travels "faster than the sun".
Concorde takes off at 220 knots (250mph) (compared with 165 knots for most subsonic aircraft). She cruises at around 1350mph - more than twice the speed of sound - and at an altitude of up to 60,000 ft (over 11 miles high). A typical London to New York crossing would take a little less than three and a half hours as opposed to about eight hours for a subsonic flight. Travelling Westwards, the five-hour time difference meant Concorde effectively arrived before she left. She travels "faster than the sun".
Friday, 4 June 2010
Concorde May Fly Again
Last weekend a former Concorde engineer performed a preliminary engine inspection on one of the Mach 2 airliners in hopes of green-lighting the resurrection of the Concorde as a flying piece of aviation history instead of a mothballed museum display.
Labels:
concorde,
concorde history,
fly concorde,
olympus engines
Tuesday, 25 May 2010
Concorde ‘Father’ In Spotlight Over Tyre Risk Oversight
The failure to address a tyre-related safety weak spot may end up costing the ‘father of the Concorde’ a suspended prison sentence.
Full article: http://www.tyrepress.com/News/19604.html
Full article: http://www.tyrepress.com/News/19604.html
Wednesday, 7 April 2010
Continental Employee Testifies At Concorde Trial
A retired Continental Airlines maintenance chief defended himself Tuesday from charges that he was partly responsible for the crash of a Concorde supersonic jet a decade ago.
Full story: http://www.examiner.com/a-2542314~Continental_employee_testifies_at_Concorde_trial.html
Full story: http://www.examiner.com/a-2542314~Continental_employee_testifies_at_Concorde_trial.html
Thursday, 1 April 2010
Concorde Crash Criminal Trial Begins
On July 25 2000 Concorde crashed shortly after take-off from Roissy Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris, killing all 109 passengers and crew, as well as four people on the ground. Almost 10 years later, on February 2 2010, the hearing relating to the crash finally commenced in the criminal action pursued before the Pontoise Criminal Court. The hearing is scheduled to last until May 28 2010.
Full story: http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=fa3ae03c-6bbb-440a-9724-593805780223
Full story: http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=fa3ae03c-6bbb-440a-9724-593805780223
Labels:
air france,
babara harmer,
concorde,
concorde history,
concorde trial
Monday, 22 March 2010
Concorde Flight Characteristics
While commercial jets take eight hours to fly from New York to Paris, the average supersonic flight time on the transatlantic routes was just under 3.5 hours. In transatlantic flight, Concorde traveled more than twice as fast as other aircraft.
In regular service, Concorde employed an efficient cruise-climb flight profile. As aircraft lose weight from consuming fuel, they can fly at progressively higher altitudes. This is (generally) more efficient, so conventional airliners employ a stepped climb profile, where air traffic control will approve a change to a higher flight level as the flight progresses.
During a landing approach Concorde was on the "back side" of the drag force curve, where raising the nose would increase the sink rate. The delta-shaped wings allowed Concorde to attain a higher angle of attack than conventional aircraft, as it allowed the formation of large low pressure vortices over the entire upper wing surface, maintaining lift. This low pressure caused Concorde to disappear into a self-induced bank of fog on humid days. These vortices formed only at low air speeds, meaning that during the initial climb and throughout the approach Concorde experienced light turbulence and buffeting. Interestingly, the vortex lift created by Concorde’s wing just prior to touchdown supplied its own mild turbulence.
With no other civil traffic operating at its cruising altitude of about 56,000 ft (17,000 m), dedicated oceanic airways or "tracks" were used by Concorde to cross the Atlantic. These SST ("Super-Sonic Transport") tracks were designated:
BA flights flown by Concorde added "Concorde" in addition to the standard "Speedbird" callsign to notify Air Traffic Control of the aircraft’s unique abilities and restrictions. The flight numbers of BA’s Concorde flights to/from the USA were 001–004; these BA Concordes therefore used callsigns "Speedbird Concorde 1" through to "Speedbird Concorde 4". The service to/from Barbados, special charter flights, and test flights prior to a return to service following maintenance used the prefix "Speedbird Concorde" followed by the relevant four-digit flight number. Air France Concordes used the standard "Airfrans" callsign.
Source: Wikipedia
In regular service, Concorde employed an efficient cruise-climb flight profile. As aircraft lose weight from consuming fuel, they can fly at progressively higher altitudes. This is (generally) more efficient, so conventional airliners employ a stepped climb profile, where air traffic control will approve a change to a higher flight level as the flight progresses.
During a landing approach Concorde was on the "back side" of the drag force curve, where raising the nose would increase the sink rate. The delta-shaped wings allowed Concorde to attain a higher angle of attack than conventional aircraft, as it allowed the formation of large low pressure vortices over the entire upper wing surface, maintaining lift. This low pressure caused Concorde to disappear into a self-induced bank of fog on humid days. These vortices formed only at low air speeds, meaning that during the initial climb and throughout the approach Concorde experienced light turbulence and buffeting. Interestingly, the vortex lift created by Concorde’s wing just prior to touchdown supplied its own mild turbulence.
With no other civil traffic operating at its cruising altitude of about 56,000 ft (17,000 m), dedicated oceanic airways or "tracks" were used by Concorde to cross the Atlantic. These SST ("Super-Sonic Transport") tracks were designated:
- Track Sierra Mike (SM); a uni-directional track used by westbound flights of both Air France and British Airways.
- Track Sierra November (SN); a uni-directional track used by eastbound flights of both Air France and British Airways.
- Track Sierra Oscar (SO); a bi-directional track used by westbound Air France flights which might conflict with westbound British Airways flights routing simultaneously on Track SM, and by eastbound Air France flights which might conflict with eastbound British Airways flights routing simultaneously on Track SN.
- Track Sierra Papa (SP); a uni-directional seasonal track used by westbound British Airways flights routing from London Heathrow to Barbados.
BA flights flown by Concorde added "Concorde" in addition to the standard "Speedbird" callsign to notify Air Traffic Control of the aircraft’s unique abilities and restrictions. The flight numbers of BA’s Concorde flights to/from the USA were 001–004; these BA Concordes therefore used callsigns "Speedbird Concorde 1" through to "Speedbird Concorde 4". The service to/from Barbados, special charter flights, and test flights prior to a return to service following maintenance used the prefix "Speedbird Concorde" followed by the relevant four-digit flight number. Air France Concordes used the standard "Airfrans" callsign.
Source: Wikipedia
Labels:
british airways concorde,
concorde,
concorde history
Monday, 8 March 2010
Aviation In Bristol Celebrates 100 Years Of Flight
Aircraft production began in Filton in 1910, less than two years after the first recorded flight of a powered aeroplane in British skies.
The Boxkite biplane was a big success for the British and Colonial Aeroplane Company (BCAC) - BCAC was renamed the Bristol Aeroplane Company in 1920.
The factory at Filton was the largest in Europe by the start of World War II.
BBC Radio Bristol took part in a day of celebrations on Friday, 19 February, 2010 to mark the centenary.
Events included a special flight from Bristol International Airport to Filton which took off on Friday morning.
After the plane - the newly named 'Sir George White' easyJet Airbus A319 - landed in Filton, there were a number of speeches which detailed the history of aviation in Bristol since 1910 - the script was produced by Airbus and included actors wearing Edwardian dress.
The anniversary flight then returned to Bristol International Airport and landed at around 12.40pm.
'Filton's Concorde'
In April 2003, British Airways and Air France jointly announced the retirement of their Concorde fleets.
The supersonic airliner has a long association with Bristol, being designed and assembled both at Filton and in France.
On 26 November 2003, the Bristol Aero Collection and Airbus UK were lucky enough to receive the last Concorde built, when G-BOAF landed at Filton for preservation.
The Boxkite biplane was a big success for the British and Colonial Aeroplane Company (BCAC) - BCAC was renamed the Bristol Aeroplane Company in 1920.
The factory at Filton was the largest in Europe by the start of World War II.
BBC Radio Bristol took part in a day of celebrations on Friday, 19 February, 2010 to mark the centenary.
Events included a special flight from Bristol International Airport to Filton which took off on Friday morning.
After the plane - the newly named 'Sir George White' easyJet Airbus A319 - landed in Filton, there were a number of speeches which detailed the history of aviation in Bristol since 1910 - the script was produced by Airbus and included actors wearing Edwardian dress.
The anniversary flight then returned to Bristol International Airport and landed at around 12.40pm.
'Filton's Concorde'
In April 2003, British Airways and Air France jointly announced the retirement of their Concorde fleets.
The supersonic airliner has a long association with Bristol, being designed and assembled both at Filton and in France.
On 26 November 2003, the Bristol Aero Collection and Airbus UK were lucky enough to receive the last Concorde built, when G-BOAF landed at Filton for preservation.
Wednesday, 3 March 2010
Thursday, 11 February 2010
Droop Nose
Concorde’s drooping nose was a compromise between the need for a streamlined design to reduce drag and increase aerodynamic efficiency in flight and the need for the pilot to see properly during taxi, takeoff, and landing operations. A delta-wing aircraft takes off and lands with a high angle of attack (a high nose angle) compared to other wing planforms, due to the way the delta wing generates lift. The pointed nose would obstruct the pilots’ view of taxiways and runways, so Concorde’s nose was designed to allow for different positioning for different operations. The droop nose was accompanied by a moving visor that was retracted into the nose prior to the nose being lowered. When the nose was raised back to horizontal, the visor was raised ahead of the front cockpit windscreen for aerodynamic streamlining in flight.
A controller in the cockpit allowed the visor to be retracted and the nose to be lowered to 5° below the standard horizontal position for taxiing and takeoff. Following takeoff and after clearing the airport, the nose and visor were raised. Shortly before landing, the visor was again retracted and the nose lowered to 12.5° below horizontal for maximum visibility. Upon landing, the nose was raised to the five-degree position to avoid the possibility of damage. On rare occasions, the aircraft could take off with the nose fully down.
A final position had the visor retracted into the nose but the nose in the standard horizontal position. This setup was used for cleaning the windscreen and for short subsonic flights.
The two prototype Concordes had two fixed "glass holes" on their retractable visors. The US Federal Aviation Administration objected to that restrictive visibility and demanded a different design before it would permit Concorde to serve US airports, which led to the redesigned visor used on the production aircraft and the four "pre-production" aircraft.
A controller in the cockpit allowed the visor to be retracted and the nose to be lowered to 5° below the standard horizontal position for taxiing and takeoff. Following takeoff and after clearing the airport, the nose and visor were raised. Shortly before landing, the visor was again retracted and the nose lowered to 12.5° below horizontal for maximum visibility. Upon landing, the nose was raised to the five-degree position to avoid the possibility of damage. On rare occasions, the aircraft could take off with the nose fully down.
A final position had the visor retracted into the nose but the nose in the standard horizontal position. This setup was used for cleaning the windscreen and for short subsonic flights.
The two prototype Concordes had two fixed "glass holes" on their retractable visors. The US Federal Aviation Administration objected to that restrictive visibility and demanded a different design before it would permit Concorde to serve US airports, which led to the redesigned visor used on the production aircraft and the four "pre-production" aircraft.
Monday, 8 February 2010
Concorde Trial Starts With Victims Remembered
This article was taken from The Telegraph 2nd February 2010:
The names of the 113 victims of the Concorde disaster were read out in a French court as six defendants went on trial.
Dozens of experts and 60 witnesses will give evidence in the four-month trial in Pontoise, near Paris, in what promises to be a highly technical battle over what brought the Air France jet down next to a hotel near Charles de Gaulle airport barely a minute after taking off for New York.
But on Tuesday at the start of the trial the presiding judge urged the court not to let "the inevitable technical details" overshadow "the human dimension" of the case, in which the defendants are charged with unintentional homicide.
The families of the 100 mainly German passengers were not in court, as they have already accepted £100 million in compensation from Air France in a definitive settlement. However, the family of the plane's captain and four people killed on the ground are all civil plaintiffs.
"I am here to remind people that this is not the trial of an empty plane," said Stéphane Gicquel, head of Fenvac, the national federation of collective accident victims.
The case will answer a key question: was Concorde a fragile bird by design or the victim of a freak accident?
French prosecutors argued that a 17-inch scrap of metal on the runway caused the crash. A Continental Airlines DC-10 shed the titanium "wear strip" on the runway four minutes before takeoff, they said. This acted as a "razor blade", gashing the Concorde's tyre and showering pieces of rubber into the fuel tanks, which caused a fire.
The airline and two of its US employees are charged with involuntary homicide. Their lawyer, Olivier Metzner, said: "I am here to establish that Continental Airlines is not responsible for the accident. I question the independence of the investigators. They wanted to protect Concorde, the image if gave of France."
He maintained that the jet should have been grounded given its known weaknesses, namely tyres prone to burst and insufficiently robust fuel tanks. The plane in question was overloaded and took off missing a piece to stabilize the wheels, he said.
Some 28 witnesses noted a fire on board the Concorde eight seconds and 800 yards before it hit the metal strip, he said. Mr Metzner called for the case to be called off as the document ordering the trial failed to factor in the witnesses' counter arguments.
Air France, a civil plaintiff, disputes Continental's claims.
Also charged with manslaughter are a former senior French air safety official and two retired Concorde engineers. They are accused of failing to resolve design weak spots, but their lawyers said they were not to blame and that the accident could not have been predicted.
A lawyer representing the pilot's family said that the metal strip should not have caused the crash. "There are always 'foreign bodies' [on runways], he said. If a strip like that caused the crash, air transport should be stopped altogether".
If convicted, Continental faces a maximum fine of £328,000 and the five individual defendants face up to five years in jail and a fine £66,000.
Meanwhile a British survivor of the disaster who was trapped in the burning hotel said she was still traumatised by her ordeal.
Alice Brooking, 22, from Sevenoaks, told the Evening Standard: "Whenever an aircraft passes overhead I shudder and look towards the sky."
Source: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/7139997/Concorde-trial-starts-with-victims-remembered.html
The names of the 113 victims of the Concorde disaster were read out in a French court as six defendants went on trial.
Dozens of experts and 60 witnesses will give evidence in the four-month trial in Pontoise, near Paris, in what promises to be a highly technical battle over what brought the Air France jet down next to a hotel near Charles de Gaulle airport barely a minute after taking off for New York.
But on Tuesday at the start of the trial the presiding judge urged the court not to let "the inevitable technical details" overshadow "the human dimension" of the case, in which the defendants are charged with unintentional homicide.
The families of the 100 mainly German passengers were not in court, as they have already accepted £100 million in compensation from Air France in a definitive settlement. However, the family of the plane's captain and four people killed on the ground are all civil plaintiffs.
"I am here to remind people that this is not the trial of an empty plane," said Stéphane Gicquel, head of Fenvac, the national federation of collective accident victims.
The case will answer a key question: was Concorde a fragile bird by design or the victim of a freak accident?
French prosecutors argued that a 17-inch scrap of metal on the runway caused the crash. A Continental Airlines DC-10 shed the titanium "wear strip" on the runway four minutes before takeoff, they said. This acted as a "razor blade", gashing the Concorde's tyre and showering pieces of rubber into the fuel tanks, which caused a fire.
The airline and two of its US employees are charged with involuntary homicide. Their lawyer, Olivier Metzner, said: "I am here to establish that Continental Airlines is not responsible for the accident. I question the independence of the investigators. They wanted to protect Concorde, the image if gave of France."
He maintained that the jet should have been grounded given its known weaknesses, namely tyres prone to burst and insufficiently robust fuel tanks. The plane in question was overloaded and took off missing a piece to stabilize the wheels, he said.
Some 28 witnesses noted a fire on board the Concorde eight seconds and 800 yards before it hit the metal strip, he said. Mr Metzner called for the case to be called off as the document ordering the trial failed to factor in the witnesses' counter arguments.
Air France, a civil plaintiff, disputes Continental's claims.
Also charged with manslaughter are a former senior French air safety official and two retired Concorde engineers. They are accused of failing to resolve design weak spots, but their lawyers said they were not to blame and that the accident could not have been predicted.
A lawyer representing the pilot's family said that the metal strip should not have caused the crash. "There are always 'foreign bodies' [on runways], he said. If a strip like that caused the crash, air transport should be stopped altogether".
If convicted, Continental faces a maximum fine of £328,000 and the five individual defendants face up to five years in jail and a fine £66,000.
Meanwhile a British survivor of the disaster who was trapped in the burning hotel said she was still traumatised by her ordeal.
Alice Brooking, 22, from Sevenoaks, told the Evening Standard: "Whenever an aircraft passes overhead I shudder and look towards the sky."
Source: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/7139997/Concorde-trial-starts-with-victims-remembered.html
Friday, 5 February 2010
Concorde Captain Talks About Barrel Roll
Brian Walpole talks about Concorde, mentioning the occasion he barrel-rolled her.
Tuesday, 2 February 2010
A Transatlantic Flight Aboard Concorde
The scene on the ramp at Heathrow's Terminal Four, with two needle-nosed, ogival wing-shaped Concordes in British Airways' livery and nary another aircraft type visible, had been like discovering an advanced time pocket in which a science fiction setting of exclusively supersonic aircraft had formed an integral part of this future society's air transportation system. But what had made this vista particularly awe striking had been the fact that, in 1994, that this scene had been played out for almost two decades. Aircraft G-BOAC, operating as Flight BA 189 to Washington-Dulles, and aircraft G-BOAG, operating as Flight BA 003 to New York-JFK, had been in the process of being serviced for their daily, evening transatlantic supersonic crossings, while a third had conducted its nose-high flare in the distance. I would bullet across the pond on the second of the two.Pushed back from the gate at 1900 local time by the tug connected to its elongated wheel strut well below its needle nose, the aircraft had extended its visor and nose cone to the five-degree position before maneuvering away from Terminal Four under its own power with a brief throttle advancement.
Inter-tank fuel transfer, ensuring an aft, 53.5-percent center of gravity and increased take off wing lift, had been coupled with a 1.5-unit, pre-set stabilizer trim. The ogival wing's design itself, incorporating camber, twist, taper, and droop, along with its significant area, had precluded the necessity for leading or trailing edge high-lift devices, thus decreasing structural weight and drag, and its long chord, obviating the need for separate elevators, had permitted the effective replacement of six trailing edge elevons which had been operated by an equal number of power flying control units fed by 4,000-psi hydraulic fluid systems pressurized by engine-driven pumps and activated by electrical, or fly-by-wire, signaling. Two identically powered vertical tail surfaces had completed Concorde's hinged devices, for a total of eight.
Turning on to the threshold of Runway 9-Right and throttling into its acceleration roll, Concorde G-BOAG, unleashing a deafening roar with its four Rolls Royce/SNECMA Olympus 593 turbojets, ate the runway with deep, throaty determination, inducing its rotational pitch by its six, upward-angling elevons at a 194-knot V1 speed and disengaging itself from the ground at a 217-knot V2 to cater to its 177,800-kg gross weight, trailing a thick smoke plume. Fuel added to its afterburner gases dilated its exhaust nozzles with fire-like fury, increasing its thrust capability by 17-percent and producing a 1.7-greater thrust-to-weight ratio than the Air Namibia 747 which had preceded it into the sky.
Ceasing afterburner light one minute, 15 seconds into the flight due to overland supersonic speed restrictions, the now power-depleted aircraft dipped its nose downward to assume a shallower ascent profile.
Having completed its initial departure course left bank and two right ones, it had proceeded on a westerly heading over Reading toward the west coast of Great Britain, climbing through 5,500 feet at a Mach 0.57 airspeed over the ground's green patchwork quilt whose geometric pattern receded in size beneath the 70-degree swept ogival wings.
A slightly pink-hued mist off the port side, where the sun had begun to inch toward the western horizon, had brush-stroked the sky's canvas, but Flight 003 would outpace the day's denouement to its destination, never eclipsing the line between light and darkness.
Climbing through 9,000 feet at 500 knots, or Mach 0.71, the aircraft, with its nose and visor having been intermittently raised, shifted its center of gravity to 55 percent. Its 13-tank fuel system, located in its delta wings and arranged in three groups according to "engine feed," "main transfer," and "trim transfer," had been the design's only method of center of gravity shift, although the tanks' equal distribution throughout the wings' planform had ensured that it would remain constant during in-flight fuel burn unless transfer had necessitated pitch changes, such as those during descent.
Passing out over the glass-appearing surface of the Bristol Channel, south of Cardiff, Wales, at 51 degrees north latitude, the aircraft had completed its transonic checklist and the throaty grind of its engines had indicated full throttle applications and afterburner re-alighting. As if unleashed from hitherto invisible moorings, the needle-nosed aircraft, emitting fire-trailing, fuel-burning, thrust-producing projections from its two Olympus turbojet pairings with a barely detectable forward lurch, had transcended the speed and pressure of sound and settled into the Mach 1.00 eclipsing, altitude-gaining, nose high-projecting flight profile for which the engineers had intended it during its 15-year development period. Closely carrying its engines next to its narrow, arrow-like fuselage beneath its ogival wing, and generating no horizontal tail air resistance, the aircraft had entered the rock-steady, motionless void between the pale blue of the channel below and the indigo blue of sky above south of Ireland, accelerating through Mach 1.24, an envelope no present subsonic airliner had ever experienced. For Concorde, it had been "home."
Three thousand four hundred thirty miles had separated Flight 003 from its destination, a distance to be devoured at a little less than double its current 860 knots. Passing over a contrail emitted by a subsonic airliner which had undoubtedly been at the peak of its service ceiling, it had reached an altitude just over half of its own.
Shrouded in roaring slipstream and ascending through 43,000 feet at a 1,090-knot, or March 1.70, airspeed, the aircraft had discontinued afterburner use, its climb angle no longer supportable by their excess power.
As Concorde's needle nose had pierced the tropopause at supersonic speeds, a delicate balancing act had begun: with the engine's insatiable, 50,000-pounds-of-fuel-per-hour thirst at full throttle settings, the aircraft would quickly exceed its maximum design speed due to in-flight burn-off and a resultant decrease in gross weight. Instead, the airspeed increase would be counteracted by a gradual ascent through its assigned block altitude, its auto flight system ensuring a Mach 2.00 velocity.
Delicate cirrus wisps moved well below the delta wings at a velocity I had never previously experienced.
A five-course dinner, paralleling British Airways' subsonic Club World business class service, had commenced in the narrow, single-aisle cabin.
Cocooned in the slender, tapering fuselage on the lower fringes of space where the earth's curvature had just become visible and trailing an invisible, cone-shaped wave whose thunderclap-like explosion could only be heard by an Atlantic surface-plying vessel, delta-winged Concorde G-BOAG had cruised ten miles above the planet, devouring 23 miles with every sweep of the clock's second hand, friction-induced heat producing 127-degree Celsius temperatures on its nose, 92 degrees at it wing root, and 98 degrees at its tip. Wing tank-located fuel rose to the 200-degree boiling point. The tiny, 46 passenger windows lining either side of the fuselage, had been hot to the touch, yet, because of the aircraft's 10.7 pounds-per-square-inch pressure differential, its cabin elevation had been the equivalent of 5,600 feet, 2,400 feet lower than that traditionally created by a subsonic airliner cruising at 37,000 feet. The radiation meter in the cockpit, running from 0.1 to 1,000 millirons, with "10" the "alert" reading and "50" the "action" position, had hovered between 0.7 and 0.9, a level higher than that of a subsonic, but Concorde's speed had exposed its passengers and crew to this level for a shorter period of time.
Pursuing the Atlantic by latitude and longitude coordinate waypoints, each separated by minutes and progressive fuel burn off-induced weight reductions, the aircraft had paradoxically seemed suspended, without motion, over the ocean-blanketed white fleece-like cumulonimbus whose pattern had resembled an intricately connected mosaic of pack ice south of Greenland, one of the crossing's untouched land masses. In fact, it would not encounter land until it had reached a point just miles from its assigned runway.
Having pinnacled at 57,000 feet, and having subjected its aluminum-alloy fuselage to an eight-inch, heat-generated, enroute expansion, the supersonic transport, maintaining altitude, retarded its four engine throttles to an initial 18-degree and subsequent 34-degree position at Mach 1.60. Attaining a 1,000-knot indicated air speed, it had been subjected to its second cooling-heating cycle as it had begun to penetrate lower-altitude, higher-temperature air. Retransferring fuel to the forward wing tanks and activating its anti-atmospheric devices, such as its pitot tube heat, it had maintained a 5,000 foot-per-minute descent rate until it had intercepted 39,000 feet, the upper realm of subsonic travel.
Recrossing land for the first time since Great Britain, Concorde had passed over the western tip of Rockaway Beach, unleashing its long-strutted undercarriage into the slipstream and extending its nose to its full, 12-5-degree position.
Crossing Rockaway Inlet and southern Brooklyn, Flight 003 had been handed off from terminal radar approach control to the JFK Tower, executing the Belt Parkway-paralleling Canarsie Approach to Runway 13-Right. Its flapless, ogival-shaped wings, which had required long main gear struts to cater to its high flare angle clearance requirements, had necessitated final-stage, height-to-ground radio altimeter readings: 500 feet...400...300...
Making a final right bank to 130 degrees, Concorde, with its drooped nose and hawk-like, outstretched main wheel struts, had passed over the airport-perimeter roadway and runway-protective blast fence at a 155-knot Vref speed to overcome its 105,433-kg landing weight. Flaring on to the strip with an additional one-degree backward yoke movement, it had entered ground effect, cushioned between the surface and its underside at 100 feet, which had required a further elevon application in order to maintain its pitch angle. The radio altimeter had continued to unwind: 50 feet...40...30...20...
Closing its throttles at 15 feet, it bit into the concrete with main wheel tire erupting smoke puffs before applying sufficient forward yoke pressure to rotate the nose wheel to the surface, yet maintain a small enough cushion effect to do so.
Decelerating to 100 knots, it had throttled its two outboard engines into their idle reverse thrust settings, mimicking the action with its two inboard engines at 75 knots, their secondary nozzle buckets closing, like clamshell doors, over the exhaust and deflecting it up- and downward.
Making the 180-degree turn on to taxiway echo to the inner perimeter, aircraft G-BOAG, whose glowing, energy-absorbing brakes had intermittently heated up to 300 degrees Celsius, had raised its nose to the five-degree position a final time and taxied to Gate 5 of the British Airways Terminal, now inundated on the ramp by a fleet of widebody, subsonic 747, DC-10, and 767 intercontinental equipment, appearing strangely out-of-place, like a design of the future which had somehow returned to the past.
Defeated in numbers, but triumphant in speed, Concorde, shutting down its engines at 1750 local time and causing its trailing edge, hydraulic power-severed elevons to gravity-snag downward, had completed the 3,458-mile transatlantic crossing in three hours, 19 minutes, or half the time of an intercontinental subsonic.
Having made the subsonic crossing myself on countless previous occasions, I exited the slender forward, left aircraft door and tunneled through the jetbridge to the terminal, somewhat disoriented. I had clearly been in New York, but what had happened to the other half of the journey, I had wondered? Somewhere over the Atlantic, in a three-sided equation of time, speed, and distance, lay the answer...
A graduate of Long Island University-C.W. Post Campus with a summa-cum-laude BA Degree in
Comparative Languages and Journalism, I have subsequently earned the Continuing Community Education Teaching Certificate from the Nassau Association for Continuing Community Education (NACCE) at Molloy College, the Travel Career Development Certificate from the Institute of Certified Travel Agents (ICTA) at LIU, and the AAS Degree in Aerospace Technology at the State University of New York - College of Technology at Farmingdale. Having amassed almost three decades in the airline industry, I managed the New York-JFK and Washington-Dulles stations at Austrian Airlines, created the North American Station Training Program, served as an Aviation Advisor to Farmingdale State University of New York, and devised and taught the Airline Management Certificate Program at the Long Island Educational Opportunity Center. A freelance author, I have written some 70 books of the short story, novel, nonfiction, essay, poetry, article, log, curriculum, training manual, and textbook genre in English, German, and Spanish, having principally focused on aviation and travel, and I have been published in book, magazine, newsletter, and electronic Web site form. I am a writer for Cole Palen's Old Rhinebeck Aerodrome in New York. I have made some 350 lifetime trips by air, sea, rail, and road.
Article Source: http://EzineArticles.com/?expert=Robert_Waldvogel
Monday, 11 January 2010
Concorde Timeline
Supersonic airline research in Europe began in 1956 and resulted in the British and French Governments signing an international treaty for the joint design, development and manufacture of a supersonic airliner six years later. The first prototype was rolled out at Toulouse in 1967 and since then, there have been a number of notable dates in the history of Concorde.2 March 1969
First flight of Concorde 001 from Toulouse France.
9 April 1969
First flight of Concorde 002 from Filton, Bristol, UK to its test centre at Fairford.
1 October 1969
Concorde's first supersonic flight.
28 June 1972
British Airways (BOAC) orders five Concordes.
20 September 1973
Concorde 002 lands at Dallas/ Fort Worth on first visit to the USA.
17 June 1974
Concorde makes its first double Atlantic crossing in one day.
5 December 1975
UK Civil Aviation Authority awards Concorde its Certificate of Airworthiness.
21 January 1976
British Airways commences commercial supersonic travel from London to Bahrain.
22 November 1977
British Airways Concorde's first London - New York commercial flight.
8 November 1986
First round the world flight by a British Airways Concorde - covering 28,238 miles in 29 hours 59 minutes.
7 February 1996
Concorde G-BOAD crosses the Atlantic between New York and London in a new record flight time of 2 hours, 52 minutes and 59 seconds.
11 August 1999
Two British Airways Concordes fly in supersonic formation to chase the total eclipse of the sun.
7 November 2001
British Airways re-launches its scheduled services to New York.
4 June 2002
Concorde flies up the Mall with the Red Arrows to celebrate the Queen's Golden Jubilee.
24 October 2003
Concorde makes it’s last commercial flight from New York to London.
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